We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In our model a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one of the two players the ‡ow through it su¤ers some friction or decay, but more than when it is supported by both players. When the friction in singly-supported links is maximal (i.e. there is no ‡ow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model, while when ‡ow in singly-supported links is as good as in doubly-supported links we have Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model. In this setting, a joint generalization of the results relative to e¢ ciency and stability in both seminal papers is achieved, and the robustness in both models is tested with positive results.
Introduction
The importance of the role played by the network structures underlying social and economic phenomena is now widely recognized 1 . From a theoretical point of view, perhaps the most challenging issue is the formation of network structures. There are two main models of strategic network formation in economic literature: that of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , where a link between two "players" (individuals, …rms, towns, etc.) needs the support of both and forms only if both agree, and that of Bala and Goyal (2000a) , where players can form links unilaterally. Jackson and Wolinsky's model has two variants: the connections model and the coauthors model. Bala and Goyal's model also has two versions: the one-way ‡ow model, in which ‡ow through a link runs toward a player only if he/she supports it, and the two-way ‡ow model, in which ‡ow runs in both directions through all links.
These seminal models have had a great impact on the literature 2 , and are at the root of several extensions resulting from introducing di¤erent variations into one model or the other. This paper addresses a di¤erent goal: the uni…cation of the two models by eliminating the dichotomy of unilateral vs. bilateral formation of links. This is achieved by a model that bridges the gap between the two basic models of strategic network formation 3 . More precisely, we provide a model which has Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model and Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model as extreme cases. In the model introduced here a link can be created unilaterally and ‡ow occurs in both directions with some degree of decay, the same in both directions. However, when a link is only supported by one of the two players (such a link is referred to as a "weak" link) the ‡ow through it su¤ers a greater decay than when it is supported by both players (a "strong" link). That is, strong links work better than weak links, which may be a reasonable assumption in some contexts 4 . When the decay in weak links is maximal (i.e. there is no ‡ow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model, where only strong links work, whereas when ‡ow in weak links is as good as in strong links we have Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model, where strong links are ine¢ cient and unstable. In contrast to these two extreme cases, it seems reasonable to consider intermediate situations where both types of link work, but strong doubly-supported links work better than weak singly-supported ones. This joint generalization of both seminal models allows for a study of the transition from one to the other, thus providing a "neighborhood"of each model which o¤ers a point of view for testing the robustness of the results for each of the extreme cases.
We …rst provide a characterization of e¢ cient architectures which smoothly extends the results relative to e¢ ciency in the seminal papers (Proposition 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , and Proposition 5.5 in Bala and Goyal (2000a) ). As it turns out, in spite of the richer variety of feasible structures in this model, possibly combining weak and strong links (which complicates considerably the proofs), only the e¢ cient structures in either model, i.e. the complete network of strong links, the complete network of weak links, the all-encompassing star of strong links or that of weak links, and the empty network, are e¢ cient in this more general setting. No mixed structure is e¢ cient for any value of the parameters.
As both a strictly noncooperative point of view and one allowing for pairwise agreements make sense in this joint generalization, we study the model in the cross…re of both approaches. Thus we study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise stability. The notion of pairwise stability needs to be adapted for this more general model, where an individual's potential actions include creating weak links or even making a preexisting weak link strong by making it double. A natural adaptation of this notion consistent with this situation is provided. A study of stability from the two points of view of the e¢ cient structures yields an incomplete characterization, which includes as particular cases the results obtained separately in either model (Proposition 2 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , and Proposition 5.3 in Bala and Goyal (2000a) ).
Thus, in both respects, i.e. e¢ ciency and stability, transition from one model to the other turns out to be perfectly smooth, so that both models are robust and compatible from the point of view provided by this more general model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and terminology. Section 3 reviews the strategic models of network formation of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000a) . A model that bridges the gap between these two is presented in Section 4.1, and the pairwise stability notion is adapted to the new setting in 4.2. Section 5.1 addresses the question of e¢ ciency for the intermediate model. In Section 5.2 Nash stable, Nash strictly stable and pairwise stable structures are studied, and Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions and points out some lines of further research.
Preliminaries

5
A directed N -graph is a pair (N; ), where N = f1; 2; :::; ng is a …nite set with n 3 whose elements are called nodes, and is a subset of N N , whose elements are called links. When both (i; j), and (j; i) are in , we say that i and j are connected by a strong link, while if only one of them is there we say that they are connected by a weak link. If M N , the M -subgraph of (N; ) is the M -graph (M; j M ) with
Alternatively, a graph can be speci…ed by a map g : N N ! f0; 1g,
When we specify a graph by a map g, we denote g ij := g(i; j), and if g ij = 1 link (i; j) is referred to as "link ij in g", and we write ij 2 g. Note that for M N , subgraph j M is speci…ed by g j M M but, abusing the notation, this subgraph is denoted by g j M . The empty graph is denoted by g e (i.e. g e (i; j) = 0, for all i; j). If g ij = 1 in a graph g, g ij denotes the graph that results from replacing g ij = 1 by g ij = 0 in g; and if g ij = 0, g + ij denotes the graph that results from replacing g ij = 0 by g ij = 1. Similarly, if g ij = g ji = 1, g ij = (g ij) ji, and if g ij = g ji = 0, g + ij = (g + ij) + ji. An isolated node in a graph g is a node that is not involved in any link, that is, a node i s.t. for all j 6 = i, g ij = g ji = 0. A node is peripheral in a graph g if it is involved in a single link (weak or strong).
Given a graph g, a path of length k from j to i in g is a sequence of k + 1 distinct nodes j 0 ; j 1 ; :::; j k , s.t. j = j 0 , i = j k , and for all l = 1; :::; k, g j l 1 j l = 1 or g j l j l 1 = 1. A graph g is acyclic or contains no cycles if there is no sequence of k (k > 2) distinct nodes, i 1 ; :::; i k , s.t. for all l = 1; :::; k 1, g i l i l+1 = 1 or g i l+1 i l = 1, and g
De…nition 1 Given a graph g, and K N , the subgraph g j K is said to be: (i) A weak component of g if for any two nodes i; j 2 K (i 6 = j) there is a path from j to i in g, and no subset of N strictly containing K meets this condition.
(ii) A strong component if for any two nodes i; j 2 K (i 6 = j) there is a path of strong links from j to i in g, and no subset of N strictly containing K meets this condition.
When a component in either sense consists of a single node we say that it is a trivial component. In both senses, an isolated node, i.e. a node that is not involved in any link, is a trivial component. The size of a component is the number of nodes from which it is formed. Based on these de…nitions we have two di¤erent notions of connectedness. We say that a graph g is weakly (strongly) connected 6 if g is the unique weak (strong) component of g. Note that strong connectedness implies weak connectedness. A weak (strong) component g j K of a graph g is minimal if for all i; j 2 K s.t. g ij = 1, the number of weak (strong) components of g is smaller than the number of weak (strong) components of g ij. When g is clear from the context, we refer to a component g j K as component K.
A graph is minimally weakly (strongly) connected if it is weakly (strongly) connected and minimal. In both cases, a minimally connected graph is a tree (of weak links in one case, of strong links in the other), but, in principle, any node in such trees can be seen as the root, i.e. a reference node from which there is a unique path connecting it with any other. Note that a weakly connected graph with no cycles is a tree in general formed by weak and strong links, and in general neither minimally weakly nor strongly connected.
Given a graph g, the following notation is also used:
e. set of nodes with which i supports a link), N e (i; g) := fj 2 N : g ji = 1g (i.e. set of nodes which support a link with i),
e. set of nodes involved in a link with i):
The set of nodes connected with i by a path is denoted by N (i; g). Note that none of these sets contains i. Their cardinalities are denoted by
, and i (g) := #N (i; g). The distance between two nodes i; j (i 6 = j), denoted by d(i; j; g), is the length of the shortest path connecting them. When there is no path connecting two nodes the distance between them is said to be 1.
The graph architectures explained hereafter play a role in what follows. A line is a graph consisting of a sequence of distinct nodes connected by links where no other links exist. A star (all-encompassing star) is a graph where one node is involved in links with some (all) other players, and no other links exist. A mixed star is a star formed by weak links and strong links. A mixed star consisting of k s strong links and k w weak links is denoted by S ks;kw . A wheel consists of a sequence of nodes connected by links in which the …rst and the last in that sequence are also linked, and no other links exist. A complete (weak-complete, strong-complete) graph is one where any two nodes are involved in a link (weak link, strong link).
Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation
We consider situations where individuals may initiate or support links with other individuals under certain assumptions, thus creating a network formalized as a graph. We assume that at each node i 2 N there is an agent identi…ed by label i and referred to as player 7 i. Each player i may invest in links with other players 8 . A map g i : N nfig ! f0; 1g describes the links in which player i invests. We write g ij := g i (j); and g ij = 1 (g ij = 0) means that i invests (does not invest) in a link with j. Thus, vector g i = (g ij ) j2N nfig 2 f0; 1g N nfig speci…es the links in which i invests and is referred to as a strategy of player i. G i := f0; 1g N nfig denotes the set of i's strategies and G N = G 1 G 2 ::: G n the set of strategy pro…les. A strategy pro…le g 2 G N univocally determines a graph (N; g ) of links invested in, where g := f(i; j) 2 N N : g ij = 1g. Given a strategy pro…le g 2 G N and i 2 N , g i denotes the N nfig strategy pro…le that results by eliminating g i in g, i.e. all links in which player i invests 9 , and (g i ; g 1. Investment by player i in a link with player j entails a cost c ij > 0 for all j 6 = i. 2. The player at node j has a particular type of information or other good 10 of value v ij for player i.
3. If v = (v ij ) i;j2N is the matrix of values, c = (c ij ) i;j2N is the matrix of cost (assuming 11 c ii = v ii = 0), and g is the strategy pro…le, the payo¤ of a player is given by a function
where
is the information received by i through the actual network g under strategy pro…le g, and c i (g; c) = P j2N d (i;g) c ij the cost incurred by i. Under di¤erent assumptions, di¤erent models specify g and I i di¤erently. In all cases a game in strategic form is speci…ed: (G N ; f i g i2N ). In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) only doubly supported links actually form, i.e.
In Bala and Goyal (2000a) links are created unilaterally, i.e.
In both models the information ‡ow through a link su¤ers some degree of decay, with (0 < < 1) being the fraction of the value of information at one node that reaches another node through a link 12 . Thus, for the right instantiation of g , i.e. (2) or (3), in both cases we have:
The point of this work is to provide and study a model that bridges the gap between these two. 9 Note that if ji 2 g, then ji 2 g i . 10 Although other interpretations are possible, in general, we give preference to the interpretation in terms of information. 11 Only to make it possible to call c and v matrices. Nevertheless, in practice c ii and v ii play no role. Note also that by de…nition g ii remains unde…ned for any strategy. 12 Bala and Goyal (2000a) also consider the case of no decay, i.e. = 1. two-way ‡ow model with decay, a level of friction in the ‡ow through a link is assumed, so that only a fraction of the information at one node reaches the other through that link. In both models the ‡ow is assumed to be homogeneous (i.e. the same through all actual links). In order to bridge the gap between these two models, making a transition from one to the other possible, we introduce a very simple form of endogenous heterogeneity 13 relative to the level of decay. We consider a model where information ‡ows through all links with some degree of decay, the same in both directions, but friction is smaller through strong links.
More precisely, we consider the following model. Let (0 1) be the fraction of the value of information at one node that reaches another node through a strong link, and let (0 1) be the fraction of the value of information at one node that reaches another node through a weak link. For a graph g representing a strategy pro…le and a pair of nodes i 6 = j, let P ij (g) denote the set of paths in g from i to j. For p 2 P ij (g), let`(p) denote the length of p and !(p) the number of weak links in p.
Then i values information originating from j that arrives via p by
If information is routed via the best possible route from j to i, then i's valuation of information originating from j is
and i's overall bene…t from g (ignoring costs) is
Thus (1) becomes (note that now the actual network is the strategy pro…le, i.e. g = g):
Observe that: 0 = < < 1 yields Jackson and Wolinsky's original connections model: information ‡ows only through links in which both players invest. 0 < = < 1 yields Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model with decay: information ‡ows in both directions with the same decay through weak and strong links.
Thus, the intermediate situations, i.e. 0 < 1 yield a bridge-model between Jackson and Wolinsky's original connections model ( = 0) and Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow connections model with decay ( = ).
Stability notions
From a conceptual point of view, the …rst interesting issue raised by this "intermediate" model is how to adapt the di¤erent notions of stability used in each of the two benchmark models to this "mixed" situation. In Bala and Goyal's purely noncooperative model Nash and strict Nash equilibrium are the natural stability notions. In Jackson and Wolinsky's model, stability analysis is based on the notion of "pairwise" stability. In this transitional model a noncooperative approach based on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium makes sense, but adapting the pairwise stability notion (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 ) is more delicate. The concept introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky, in a context where only strong links make sense and actually form, consists of two requirements: (i) no player gains by severing a link ("link deletion proofness"); and (ii) no two players who are not linked have an incentive to create a strong link ("link addition proofness"). Part (i) is the stability requirement for the noncooperative dimension of Jackson and Wolinsky's model, but in the current transitional model individual players have other options, given that weak links can be created unilaterally, and so can strong links by making double an existing weak link. Thus we add a requirement of "link creation proofness"to that of "link deletion proofness", and the simplest way of "strategy-proofness"w.r.t. the modi…cation which results from combining the two: no player gains by changing his/her investment from one link into a new one.
Thus we consider the following three forms of stability.
De…nition 2 A strategy pro…le g is:
The transition
In what follows we assume homogeneity in costs and values across players, i.e. we assume v ij = 1 and c ij = c > 0, for all i; j: Consequently, we drop v and c in (5), and write i's payo¤ as:
We …rst address the question of e¢ ciency and then that of stability.
E¢ ciency
A network is said to be e¢ cient for a particular con…guration of values of the parameters if it maximizes the aggregate payo¤, referred to as the value of the network. When the value of network g, denoted by v (g), is greater than or equal to that of network g Figure 1 ). (ii) All-encompassing stars of strong links if 2 < c < + (n 2) 2 =2 (Region II in Figure 1 ). (iii) The empty network if + (n 2) 2 =2 < c (Region III in Figure 1 ). Figure 1 shows the regions where these architectures are e¢ cient. The cost, c, is represented on the vertical axis, and the fraction of the unit of information at one node that reaches another one through a link, , on the horizontal axis. In order to keep the di¤erent regions of values of the parameters bounded, only the part of the picture for c 1 is represented in the …gures, although no upper bound is imposed on c. 2 < c (Region III'in Figure 2 ).
As we presently show, the only e¢ cient architectures in our setting are, depending on the values of the parameters ( , , c and n): the strong-complete, the weak-complete, the star of strong links, the star of weak links and the empty network. In order to have a complete characterization, the region where each of them is e¢ cient must be determined. This is established in Proposition 3, where only the region where the strong-complete network is e¢ cient, and part of the region where the weak-complete network is e¢ cient are directly established. The rest is the result of several lemmas, which in a patchwork-like way cover the whole region where the parameters vary. In spite of the complexity of this piecewise study, the strategy of the proof is easy to understand. The basic idea is, as in the seminal papers, to compare the value of an arbitrary component with that of certain "dominant" structures. Nevertheless, the possibility of weak and strong links makes this comparison more complicated. In di¤erent regions of values of the parameters, it is proved that a component of a network is dominated by a star with the same number of nodes (Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4). Then it is shown that a mixed star is dominated by a star with the same number of links (either all strong or all weak) (Lemma 5). To conclude the proof, a region containing the boundary between the regions where the star of strong links and the weak-complete graph are (later proved to be) e¢ cient remains to be studied. This requires the use of di¤erent dominant structures, namely, two interesting sorts of "hybrid" structure ( Figure 3 ) between a star of strong links and a weak-complete network (Lemma 6).
Finally, such hybrid structures are proved to be dominated in that region either by a weak-complete network or by a star of strong links with the same number of nodes (Lemma 7).
Lemma 1 If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1 and c > maxf 2 ; 2 2 g, then the maximal value of a weak component containing m nodes and m 1 or more strong links is only reached by a star with m 1 strong links.
Proof. Let K be a weak component containing m nodes and k s m 1 strong links and k w 0 weak links. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that no link is super ‡uous. Then,
where p( ; ) is a polynomial on and with integer positive coe¢ cients (summing up to maxfm (m 1) 2 (k s + k w ) ; 0g, i.e. twice the number of pairs of nodes nondirectly connected) multiplying monomials of the form q r with q + r 2. As , the maximal value of this polynomial is obtained when
while the value of a star of m 1 strong links with m nodes is
Thus, the di¤erence is
given that m 1 k s 0, 2 2c 2 2 < 0 and 2 2 2 + c > 0. Moreover, it is 0 only for k s = m 1 and k w = 0. Finally, a component with k s = m 1 and k w = 0 is necessarily minimally strongly connected, and the maximal value of a minimally strongly connected component is only reached by stars of strong links.
Lemma 2 If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1 and c > 2 , then a weak component containing m nodes and fewer than m 1 strong links is dominated by a mixed star with the same number of strong links.
Proof. Let K be a weak component containing m nodes and k s < m 1 strong links and k w m 1 k s > 0 weak links. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that no link is super ‡uous. Thus, reasoning as in the preceding lemma, we have:
while the value of a star with k s strong links and m 1 k s weak links is
given that k s + k w m 1 and c > 2 . And it is 0 only for k s + k w = m 1. Finally, the maximal value of a component with m 1 links is only reached by stars.
The next lemma establishes the same result for 2 ( 2 ) < c < 2 .
Lemma 3
If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1 and 2 ( 2 ) < c < 2 , then a weak component containing m nodes and fewer than m 1 strong links is dominated by a mixed star with the same number of strong links.
Proof. Let K be a weak component containing m nodes, k s < m 1 strong links and k w m 1 k s > 0 weak links. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that no link is super ‡uous. The maximal value of the component here requires a more detailed discussion than in the case c > 2 addressed in the preceding lemma. Thus we have
where A = minfk s (k s 1); m(m 1) 2k s 2k w g:
Two cases must be considered depending on which of these numbers is smaller: 1 st case: A = m(m 1) 2k s 2k w : In this case B = C = 0, and we have
where a; b; d and e denote the coe¢ cients in the last expression. Note that a 0, while
Thus, we again have two cases:
In this case C = 0, and
Thus, subtracting this value from that of a star with k s strong links and m 1 k s weak links the di¤erence is
and proceeding just as in the …rst case we similarly conclude that v (S ks;m 1 ks ) v(K) 0:
In this case
and proceeding again as before we conclude that v (S ks;m 1 ks ) v(K) 0:
Lemma 4 If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1, and c < 2 ( ), then: (i) in an non-empty e¢ cient network all links are strong; (ii) if in addition c > 2 , then a weak component is dominated by a star of strong links.
Proof. (i) Let g be a nonempty e¢ cient network, and assume ij 2 g and ji = 2 g, then the contribution of i's (j's) unit of value to j's (i's) payo¤ is , otherwise ij would be super ‡uous, but then, as c < 2 ( ), by making ij double the sum of the payo¤s of i and j would increase, and no other player's payo¤ would decrease, which contradicts g's e¢ ciency.
(ii)
Lemma 5
If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1, a star containing both strong and weak links is strictly dominated either by a star with the same number of links all of which are strong or by a star with the same number of links all of which are weak.
Proof. Let S ks;kw be a star connecting m nodes with k s > 0 strong links and k w = m 1 k s > 0 weak links. Its value is given by
By making double a weak link, S ks+1;kw 1 results, and
Thus, as
Note that if this number is > 0, the greater k s is the greater this number will be, and consequently the value of a star of strong links connecting m nodes is greater than that of S ks;kw .
By making a double link weak, S ks 1;kw+1 results, and v (S ks 1;kw+1 ) = (k s 1) (2 2c) + (k w + 1) (2 c)
If this number is > 0, the smaller k s is the greater this number will be and consequently the value of a star of weak links is greater than that of S ks;kw . It only remains to show that the value necessarily increases by either making a weak link double or making a strong one weak, that is, either (7) or (8) 
Above c = 2 and c = 2 2 the preceding lemmas show the domination of stars, either of weak links or of strong links, for all the con…gurations of values of the parameters except the region considered in the next two lemmas, where two sorts of "hybrid" structure, somewhere between stars of strong links and weak-complete (see Figure 3) 14 , serve as a term of comparison. Let g ks be a m-node network consisting of a star with k s strong links and the rest of the nodes along with the center of the star forming a complete subnetwork of weak links (see Figure 3-a) . Then
Now, depending on the value of A, we have two cases: 1 st case: A = m(m 1) 2k s 2k w : In this case B = 0 and A A 0 . Then we have
And as 2 c < 2 and k 0 w k w + B 0 =2 = A=2 A 0 =2, and 2 < 2 2 we have: 
(ii) Let K be a weak component as in (i). Let g ks be a m-node network consisting of a star with k s strong links and any other pairs of nodes, except those of peripheral nodes of the star, connected by weak links (see Figure 3- 
Two cases must be considered depending on the value of A: 1 st case: A = m(m 1) 2k s 2k w : In this case B = 0 and A A 0 . Thus we have
and consequently
In this case B 0, and as k w + B=2 = k 0 w and c < 2 ( ), i.e. 2 < 2 c, we have:
(iii) Just note that in both cases, (i) and (ii), the component is assumed to have fewer than m 1 strong links, which includes the case of no strong links. But note that the structure proved to dominate the component, i.e. g 0 or g 0 , is a weak-complete network.
Lemma 7
If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1 and
then a weak component of a network is dominated either by a weak-complete subnetwork or by a star of strong links with the same number of nodes.
Proof. In view of the preceding lemma, in this region a component with no strong links is dominated by a weak-complete network with the same number of nodes. If a component with m nodes contains at least m 1 strong links, Lemma 1 establishes that it is dominated by a star with m 1 strong links. If it contains some strong links, but fewer than m 1, Lemma 6 shows that it is dominated by one of two types of structure with the same number k s of strong links, either g ks or g ks . We now prove that such structures are dominated either by a weak-complete subnetwork or by star of strong links with the same number of nodes. Consider …rst the case when c > 2 ( ). In this case, the dominant structure is g ks . Thus v(g ks ) is given by (9) , with (10) . Thus, comparing this value with that of v(g ks+1 ) and v(g ks 1 ), we have
We prove that one of these di¤erences is necessarily positive. Assume X + 2 2 0; that is, X 2 2 : Thus
which is > 0 if c < 2 2 + 2 4 . To see that this is so, note that < , thus ( )
Therefore one of the two di¤erences must be positive. In other words g ks is dominated either by g ks 1 or by g ks+1 . This entails that g ks is dominated by one of the extreme cases: g 0 or g m , i.e. a m-node weak-complete network or star of strong links. Consider now the case, c < 2 ( ). In this case, the dominant structure is g ks . Thus v(g ks ) is given by (11) with (12). Thus, comparing this value with that of v(g ks+1 ) and v(g ks 1 ), we have
where X = 2 2c k s (2 c) + k s 2 2 : But then one of these di¤erences is necessarily positive. Assume X + 2 2 0; that is, X 2 2 : Thus
given that c > 2 2 2 is one of the inequalities specifying the region under consideration. Thus g ks is dominated either by g ks 1 or by g ks+1 : And consequently g ks is dominated by either g 0 or g m , i.e. an m-node weak-complete network or a star of strong links.
The following result, pulling together the partial results established in the preceding lemmas, characterizes e¢ ciency for the transitional model. (Region III in Figure 6 ):
Proof. (i) As c < , an e¢ cient network is non-empty, and, as c < 2 ( ), by Lemma 4-(i), in a non-empty e¢ cient network all links are strong. Let g then be a network where all links are strong and assume nodes i and j are not connected. As c < 2 , i.e. 2 < c, both i and j improve their payo¤s if the strong link ij forms, and the other players'payo¤s do not decrease. Therefore, the unique e¢ cient network is the strong-complete one.
(ii) Consider …rst the subregion where c < 2 2 . Let g be a network where two nodes, i and j, are not directly connected. Thus i (j) receives at most 2 from j's (i's) unit of value. As 2 2 < 2 c, the sum of the payo¤s of i and j increases if a weak link between them forms, and the other players' payo¤s do not decrease. Thus, if c < 2 2 an e¢ cient network must be complete. Note that must be greater than 2 . Now as 2 ( ) < c, if a strong link ij in a complete network is replaced by a weak link, then the sum of the payo¤s of i and j increases, and the other players' payo¤s do not decrease. Therefore, if 2 ( ) < c < 2 2 then the unique e¢ cient pro…le is the weak-complete graph. The rest of the region remains to be examined, i.e. where c 2 2 . But this is a subset of the range of values of the parameters considered in Lemmas 6 and 7, where any component is dominated either by a weak-complete subnetwork or by a star of strong links with the same number of nodes. As c < 2 ( 2 ) < 2 , an e¢ cient network must be connected, therefore any network is dominated either by a weak-complete network or by an all-encompassing star of strong links. Finally, it can be checked immediately that the former dominates the latter if and only if c (n 4) 2n 4 2 (n 2) 2 , strictly if the inequality is strict, while both structures are equally e¢ cient in case of equality.
(iii) By Lemma 1, any component with at least m 1 strong links is dominated by a star of strong links. It remains to be checked that this is also the case if it has fewer than m 1 strong links. As seen in Lemma 4, in this region, when c < 2 ( ), a weak component is dominated by a star of strong links, therefore the statement is proven in this case. Now consider the case c 2 ( ). If c > 2 , Lemma 2 ensures that any component is dominated by a mixed star with the same number of strong links, and by Lemma 3 the same holds if 2 ( 2 ) < c < 2 : By Lemma 5 mixed stars are dominated either by stars of weak links or by stars of strong links, so this conclusion applies to the subset of the region under consideration where c > 2 (
2 ). The subset where 2 ( ) c < 2 ( 2 ) remains to be discussed, where Lemmas 6 and 7 apply and ensure that any component is dominated either by a weak-complete subnetwork or by a star of strong links with the same number of nodes. If c < 2 , an e¢ cient network must be connected, therefore in this region any network is dominated either by a weak-complete network or by an all-encompassing star of strong links. But the latter is dominated by the former if and only if c (n 4) 2n 4 2 (n 2) 2 , strictly if the inequality is strict, while both structures are equally e¢ cient in case of equality. Now if c 2 , Lemmas 2 and 5, ensure that any component of an e¢ cient network must be a star of either weak links or strong links. As the value of a component of an e¢ cient network must be non-negative, it is immediate to check that the value , strictly if the inequality is strict, while both structures are equally e¢ cient in case of equality. Thus, in the whole region the only non-empty e¢ cient network is the all-encompassing star of strong links. Finally, the all-encompassing star of strong links yields a non-negative value if and only if c < + (n 2) 2 =2. (iv) By the same argument used in (iii), Lemmas 1-5 ensure that in this region any network is dominated by an all-encompassing star of weak links or by one of strong links. As stated before, the former dominates the latter if and only if c 2 ( ) + (n 2) 2 2 , strictly if the inequality is strict, while both structures are equally e¢ cient in case of equality. Thus, in the whole region the only e¢ cient nonempty network is the all-encompassing star of weak links. Finally, the all-encompassing star of weak links yields non-negative value if and only if c < 2 + (n 2)
2 . (v) This follows from the discussion in (iii) and (iv). Figures 4-7 summarize Proposition 3 relative to e¢ ciency. The images correspond to the cases = 0:2 and = 0:6; with n = 20 and n = 10. Note that, as 0 < 1, only the part where 0:2 < 1 in Figures 4 and 6 (0:6 < 1 in Figures 5 and 7) is meaningful. The strong-complete network is the only e¢ cient graph in Region I: below the straight line c = 2 (
Remarks: (i)
) and the parabola c = 2 . The only e¢ cient networks in Region I'are weak-complete: above the line c = 2 ( ), and below the horizontal line c = 2 ( 2 ) and the curve c (n 4) = 2n 4 2 (n 2) 2 (a parabola). All-encompassing stars of strong links are the only e¢ cient graphs in Region II: above the last parabola and c = 2 , and below two parabolas: c = 2 ( ) + (n 2) 2 (the part of the boundary corresponding to the latter is only visible in Figure 6 ). Finally, in Region III the only e¢ cient graph is the empty network: above c = 2 + (n 2)
2 and c = + (n 2) 2 =2 (only visible in Figure 6 ).
(ii) All inequalities in Proposition 3 are strict to preserve uniqueness, but on the boundaries separating any two regions both structures are e¢ cient.
(iii) Observe that as decreases towards 0 the image of these regions approaches the "map" in Figure 1 , corresponding to Proposition 1 (i.e. Proposition 1 of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)), namely Regions I and II in Figures 4-7 expand towards Regions I and II in Figure 1 , while regions where "weak"structures are e¢ cient shrink and …nally collapse when = 0. In fact, Proposition 3 applied to case = 0 yields Proposition 1. That is, setting = 0 in (i), (iii) and (v) in Proposition 3, yields (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1, respectively.
(iv) As "moves rightward", ranging from 0 to 1; the vertical line = is Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model, with = being the fraction of a unit of information at one node that reaches another one through a link. Thus, as this line sweeps the rectangle, the boundary points separating Regions I', II' and III on the vertical line = , follow the curves c = 2 ( 2 ), and c = 2 + (n 2) 2 , which depict Figure  2 exactly. In fact, Proposition 3 applied to case = yields Proposition 2 (i.e. Proposition 5.5 of Bala and Goyal (2000a) ). That is, setting = in (ii), (iv) and (v) in Proposition 3, yields (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2, respectively.
Stability
We now study the stability of the e¢ cient structures established in Proposition 3. Pairwise stable architectures are not characterized in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , and nor are Nash stable networks in Bala and Goyal (2000a) . The following results relative to pairwise stability in Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model and to Nash and strict Nash architectures in Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model with decay are proved in those seminal papers assuming homogeneity in costs and values across players. Their statements are adapted to the terminology used here. In Jackson and Wolinsky's model all links are strong, while in Bala and Goyal's all links are weak, but who supports them may a¤ect the stability of an architecture (the same occurs in our model). A center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored, mixed-sponsored) star is a star of weak links where the center supports all links (no link, some but not all links). (ii) If 0 < c < 2 , then the unique pairwise stable network is the strong-complete graph (Region I in Figure 8 ). (iii) If 2 < c < , then an all-encompassing star of strong links is pairwise stable (Region II in Figure 8 ), but not necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph (e.g. if n = 4 and 3 < c < a line of strong links is also stable, and if c < 3 , then a wheel of strong links is also stable).
(iv) If < c, then in a nonempty pairwise stable network no player is peripheral (Region III in Figure 8 ). (ii) If 0 < c < 2 , then the unique strict Nash network is the weak-complete graph (Region I'in Figure 9 ). (iii) If 2 < c < , then all-encompassing stars of weak links are strict Nash (Region II'in Figure 9 ). (iv) If < c < + (n 2)
2 , then all-encompassing periphery-sponsored stars, and only them among all-encompassing stars, are strict Nash (Region III'in Figure 9 ). (v) If < c, then the empty network is strict Nash (Region IV'in Figure 9 ). In contrast with the seminal models, in which each requires a di¤erent notion of stability, in the transitional model both a strictly noncooperative approach and one allowing for pairwise agreements make sense, so the question of stability is addressed from both points of view. The following two propositions establish the transition between the preceding results. Proposition 6 deals with pairwise stability and Proposition 7 with Nash stability.
Proposition 6
If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1, we have: (i) A pairwise stable network has at most one non-trivial weak component (which is strong if = 0), and has at most one non-trivial strong component.
(ii) If 0 < c < minf 2 ; g, then the strong-complete graph is the unique pairwise stable network (Region I in Figures 10-11 ). (iii) If < c < 2 and < 2 = (1 + ), then weak-complete graphs are the unique pairwise stable networks (Region I'in Figures 10-11 ). (iii) The architectures studied in Proposition 6 are not the only ones which are pairwise stable. For example, for n = 4: a wheel of strong links is pairwise stable if 2 < c < ; a line of strong links if 3 < c < ; any wheel of weak links if 2 < c < 3 and < (2 + ) = (1 + + 2 ) (this last condition only applies if it is possible for a node to switch its support from one weak link to making double another existing weak link); a line of weak links whose peripheral nodes are sponsored if + 2 3 < c < and < (2 + ) = (1 + ). (iv) Note that above the line c = 2 all pairwise stable structures considered are formed exclusively by weak links, while below line c = they consist of strong links. As soon as > 0 a gap opens between lines c = and c = 2 . The following straightforward corollary emerges relative to this gap:
Corollary 1 If the payo¤ function is given by (6) with 0 < 1; < c < 2 , and < c, a non-empty pairwise stable network necessarily contains cycles.
Proof. Assume g is a pairwise stable network. By Proposition 6-(i), g is weakly connected. If < c, no peripheral player can be connected by a strong link, nor sponsored by a weak link if < c. Therefore a peripheral node can only be connected by a weak link supported by itself. But only one such peripheral node can exist, because if there were more, as c < 2 , it would then be pro…table for any pair of them to form a strong link. Consequently, under these conditions g cannot be a weakly connected graph with no cycles.
We now address noncooperative stability for the transitional model. g. Now assume these conditions hold strictly, then the network described is strict Nash.
(iii) Let g be a weak-complete network. Proceeding as in part (iii) of Proposition 6, it can be concluded that under these conditions no player has an incentive to withdraw support for any number of weak links, or switch their support to double any others, or to double any weak ones. Thus, if all these conditions hold (strictly) g is a Nash (strict Nash) network.
(iv) Let g be an all-encompassing star of strong links. The center has no incentive to withdraw support for a link (or a set of them) if c . No peripheral node is interested in forming a weak link with another (or a set of them) if c 2 . If these conditions hold strictly, then g is strict Nash.
(v) Let g be an all-encompassing periphery-sponsored star. No peripheral node has an incentive to sever its link if + (n 2) 2 c 0. If c , the center has no incentive to double a link (or a set of them). If c 2 no peripheral node has an incentive to form a weak link with another (or a set of them). Therefore, if all three conditions hold (strictly) g is a Nash (strict Nash) network. In (vi) we show that for other stars to be Nash c is required. (vi) Let g be an all-encompassing star. If it is center-sponsored or a mixedsponsored star, the center has no incentive to sever a link (or a set of them) if c (which does not apply if the star is periphery-sponsored) and no peripheral node whose link is supported by the center has an incentive to double it if + (n 2) 2 + (n 2) c, i.e. if c ( )(1 + (n 2) ). Finally, no peripheral node is interested in forming a weak link with another (or a set of them) if c 2 . If these conditions hold strictly, then g is strict Nash. (vii) This is straightforward.
Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a model which bridges the gap between the two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) bilateral connections model and Bala and Goyal (2000a) unilateral connections two-way ‡ow model. This richer hybrid model, provides a common setting for them and makes it possible to transition from one to the other.
The e¢ cient architectures are fully-characterized for all possible values of the parameters and the results relative to e¢ ciency in both seminal papers extended. One noteworthy result is that only the structures which are e¢ cient in the seminal models emerge as e¢ cient in this transitional model.
The strictly noncooperative approach and the approach based on pairwise stability both make sense and are applied in this setting. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) pairwise stability results for their connections model and those of Bala and Goyal (2000a) noncooperative stability results for their two-way ‡ow model are extended to the more general model.
The point of view provided by this continuum of models, bridging the gap between the two seminal models, shows the perfect compatibility and robustness of both in the sense that the transition from one to the other is smooth in all respects.
Some lines of further research are the following. A similar transitional model between Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) connections model and Bala and Goyal's (2000a) one-way ‡ow model with decay, or between Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow and twoway ‡ow models with decay 15 remains to be explored. Some of the extensions of the benchmark models in the literature can also be tested in this mixed model.
